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APPLY

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MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Tom Latimer

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Breakfast with Ray Cline, Thursday,  
November 19, 1970; 8:30 a.m.

General Intelligence Problems

1. Ray Cline sent you a memo on 15 September 1970 suggesting that a Special Assessments Panel be established to prepare the "estimate of the situation" part of NSC studies. He suggested that he, R. Jack Smith and General Bennett comprise the Panel, which would deal directly with you.

- You might mention his memo (you sent him a note thanking him for it but you were noncommittal about his Panel suggestion) as a way of drawing him out on any additional thoughts he has on how the intelligence community could be better organized to support the NSC.
- In particular, you might ask for his views on the estimative process.
- Also his thoughts on command and control over reconnaissance assets and activities.
- Ask him what major problems, other than Admiral Raborn, he found while he was head of the DDI at CIA and what might be done to improve them now.
- How much duplication of effort is there between DIA, CIA and INR and is that too much, too little, just right?
- Does he have any views on the 40-Committee process... is there enough--or any--review of what is proposed in that forum by DDI, INR, DIA?

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The Middle East Problem

2. On 27 October 1970 Cline sent you a copy of a briefing he gave the NATO Council of "What Really Happened" in respect to the Suez cease-fire violations. The memo did not, however, address the question of why the Soviets and UAR decided on that course of action nor did it discuss where they will go from here.

- You might ask his opinion of whether or not the Soviets and UAR are willing to offer Israel real guarantees for her security.
- How much give does he think there is on the part of the Israelis on the question of relinquishing territory?
- How have the death of Nasir and the coup in Syria affected the Soviet assessment of the situation?
- Why did the intelligence community here have so much trouble reaching an agreed position on the facts of the violation and what could have been done differently to have avoided that problem?

Cuba

3. He may want to talk to you about the Soviet activity at Cienfuegos. Ray Cline was DDI during the 1962 Cuba missile crisis and may have some views on the "understanding" which he would like to give you.

- Does he believe the Soviets would build a sub base and turn it over to the Cubans to operate?
- Will construction on such a base stop or should we expect to see it continue under the guise of a Cuban project?
- How often does he think we should schedule U-2 coverage now--how often after the tender leaves Cuba for good?

Sino-Soviet Affairs

4. At one point in his career, Ray Cline was chief of the Sino-Soviet area at CIA

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- How does he see the current state of Sino-Soviet relations?
- How worried are the Soviets over Chinese missile and nuclear weapons development and testing? Are they worried enough to launch a preemptive strike?
- Does Peking want to get into the UN enough to accept the continued presence of Nationalist China?
- Would the ChiNats accept such a two-Chinas situation, or would they pull out of UN?
- What are the long-term prospects for a Kuomintang-CCP accommodation, once the G-mo and Mao are gone? (Cline is quite close to Chiang Ching-kuo and might have a good reading on his attitudes once his father dies.)

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